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Abstract
We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal
stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium,
any sequence of n-player equilibria converges to it as n→∞. However,
both the finite and infinite player versions of the game often admit
multiple equilibria. We show that mean field equilibria satisfying a
transversality condition are limit points of n-player equilibria, but we
also exhibit a remarkable class of mean field equilibria that are not
limits, thus questioning their interpretation as “large n” equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Mean field games were introduced by [24, 25, 26] and [19, 20] to overcome
the notorious intractability of n-player games. Two key simplifications are
made. First, agents interact symmetrically through the empirical distribu-
tion of their states. Second, by formally letting n → ∞, one passes to a
representative agent whose actions do not affect this distribution because
each individual agent becomes negligible. Thus, the mean field game is seen
as an approximation of the n-player game for large n. We refer to the lecture
notes [9] and the monographs [3, 11, 12] and their extensive references for
further background.
In this paper, we conduct a case study of an n-player game of optimal
stopping where multiple equilibria may occur naturally. We formulate an
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associated mean field game and highlight that certain mean field equilibria
are limits of n-player equilibria while others are not, and study how to dis-
tinguish them. Equilibria that are not limit points are questionable from
the point of view of applications, at least if they are motivated as “n-player
games with large n.”
Several ways of connecting n-player and mean field games have been
studied in the literature. In many cases it is easier to establish the reverse
direction, namely that a given mean field equilibrium induces an approxi-
mate Nash equilibrium in the n-player game for large n. This goes back to
[20] and is by now established in some generality, see in particular [22] for
diffusion control, [13] for games of timing or [14] for finite state games (but
see also [8] for a counterexample in a degenerate case with absorption). It
then follows, conversely, that mean field equilibria are limits of approximate
n-player equilibria. However, we emphasize that approximate and actual
Nash equilibria may look quite different, and in particular one cannot ex-
pect in general that there is a true Nash equilibrium in the proximity of an
approximate one.
The convergence of n-player Nash equilibria to the mean field limit is
often more delicate. The deep result of [10] shows convergence for a class
of (closed-loop) games where agents choose drifts of diffusions. In their set-
ting, the mean field game has a unique equilibrium as a consequence of
the so-called monotonicity condition [24] which postulates that it is disad-
vantageous for agents’ states to be close to one another. In a related but
different (open-loop) framework, and without imposing uniqueness, [18] ob-
tains convergence under the assumption that the limiting measure flow is
deterministic. More comprehensively, [22] shows that n-player equilibria
converge to a weak notion of mean field equilibria which can include mix-
tures of deterministic equilibria, for a general class of diffusion-control games.
A corresponding result for games of timing is established in [13]. Most re-
cently, [23] provides results along the lines of [22] for the closed-loop case.
Convergence has also been shown in a number of more specific problems, for
instance stationary mean field games [24], linear-quadratic problems [2] or
a game of Poissonian control [29], among others. However, to the best of
our knowledge, the question which mean field equilibria are limit points of
(true) n-player equilibria has not been emphasized as such in the literature.
We can mention the parallel work [15] on a two-state game: the game has
unique n-player equilibria and these converge to a mean field equilibrium as
expected; however, a second, less plausible mean field solution can appear for
certain parameter values and this solution is not a limit. Another interesting
parallel work [16] studies several approaches of selecting an equilibrium in
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a linear-quadratic mean field game with multiple equilibria, including the
convergence of n-player equilibria. Different approaches are shown to select
different equilibria.
From the perspective of mean field games, being a limit point of n-player
equilibria can be seen as a stability property of equilibria with respect to the
number of players. We are not aware of a systematic study in this direction
(but see [6] for a recent investigation of a different stability property that
is potentially related). Since mean field equilibria are often motivated as
“large n” equilibria, it seems desirable to understand the phenomenon in some
generality and at least establish sufficient conditions. A general formulation
and investigation of this stability seems wide open at this time, whence our
focus on a case study in the present paper.
1.1 Synopsis
We start by introducing an n-player game of optimal stopping inspired by [4,
5, 13, 28] and the literature on bank-runs following [17]. In addition to their
i.i.d. signals, players observe how many other players have already stopped.
A crucial feature is that whenever an agent leaves the game, staying in the
game becomes less attractive for the remaining agents. For instance, this
may reflect that the bank is more likely to default if other clients withdraw
their savings. In particular, the game satisfies the opposite of Lasry and
Lions’ monotonicity condition, or strategic complementarity in Economics
terminology [7]. Indeed, the model exhibits a “flocking” or “herding” behavior
where groups of agents can collectively decide to stop or not. We will see that
these choices can naturally give rise to multiple equilibria; more precisely,
they parametrize the full range of n-player equilibria.
Next, we review the mean field version of the game which was intro-
duced in [28] without discussing the n-player game. Enhancing slightly a
result of [28], mean field equilibria are described by a simple equation: for
any equilibrium, the proportion ρ(t) of agents that have stopped by time t is
a zero of a deterministic function gt on [0, 1] as is Figure 1. More generally,
any equilibrium t 7→ ρ(t) is characterized as an increasing, right-continuous
selection of such zeros. In Figure 1, we can distinguish several types of ze-
ros: increasing-transversal (i), tangential (t) and decreasing-transversal (d).
These types are related to how concentrated the distribution of the agents’
signals is in a neighborhood of the zero, relative to the strength of interac-
tion. Intuitively, tangential solutions are delicate in that they may disappear
if Figure 1 is perturbed, whereas the transversal solutions are stable in this
sense.
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We then turn to our main question and study which mean field equilibria
are limits of n-player equilibria. Roughly, the main result is that
(i) Increasing-transversal solutions are limits of n-player equilibria,
(ii) decreasing-transversal solutions fail to be limits,
(iii) tangential solutions can but need not be limits.
Specifically, we first consider the minimal and maximal equilibria, cor-
responding to the left- and right-most solutions in Figure 1. The n-player
game also has such extremal equilibria and these yield natural candidates
for sequences converging to their mean field counterparts. After introducing
appropriate notions for dynamic equilibria, we show that this convergence in-
deed holds, under the condition that the solutions are increasing-transversal
(on a sufficiently large set of times t). However, we also find that if the
minimal (say) solution is tangential, the minimal n-player equilibria can
converge to a mixture of mean field equilibria and then the minimal mean
field equilibrium may fail to be a proper limit. (The minimal and maximal
solutions can be increasing-transversal or tangential, but never decreasing-
transversal.) This also yields a novel example of how randomization can
emerge in mean field games.
Second, we study the convergence to a general mean field equilibrium,
possibly somewhere in the middle of Figure 1. In that case, there are no
obvious candidates for the n-player approximations and more abstract ar-
guments need to be used. We show by a fixed point construction that all
increasing-transversal solutions are limits of n-player equilibria. Quite sur-
prisingly however, (“strongly”) decreasing-transversal solutions fail to be lim-
its despite appearing stable in Figure 1. In fact, these solutions merely occur
as parts of mixtures that are limits, and the weight within these mixtures
can be bounded by a monotone function of the slope in Figure 1. It turns out
that some fairly detailed asymptotic statistics, such as the expected number
of n-player equilibria, can be analyzed in our model—which is unusual for
mean field games.
u
0 1
gt(u)
i d t i d i
Figure 1: Types of mean field equilibria at a fixed time t
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we in-
troduce the game of optimal stopping. Section 3 describes the Nash equilibria
of the n-player version and Section 4 covers the analogue for the mean field
game. The results on the convergence to the minimal and maximal equilibria
are relatively direct and established in Section 5, whereas the more abstract
results on the convergence to general equilibria are reported in Section 6.
2 Description of the Game
Let (I, I, λ) be a probability space representing the agents; we shall be in-
terested in the n-player case with a finite I and the mean field case with an
atomless space. Let (Ω,G, P ) be another probability space, equipped with
a right-continuous filtration G = (Gt)t∈R+ and an exponentially distributed
random variable E which is independent of G.
Given an agent i ∈ I, let αi ≥ 0 be a G-progressively measurable process
which is locally integrable and consider the random time
θi = inf
{
t :
∫ t
0
αis ds = E
}
.
As in [28], one may think of θi as the time when agent i expects the default
of her bank. We fix a parameter r ∈ R, interpreted as the interest rate paid
by the bank (and assumed to be constant for simplicity). Following [28], we
suppose that αi is increasing1 and that
inf{t : αit − r ≥ 0} <∞ P -a.s. (2.1)
Denoting by T the set of all G-stopping times, we then consider the optimal
stopping problem
sup
τ∈T
E
[
erτ1{θi>τ}∪{θi=∞}
]
(2.2)
which we assume to have a finite value. Thus, if the default θi > τ , we
may think of the agent as accruing the interest on an initial unit investment
until τ , but losing everything if θi < τ . If the stopping time
τ i := inf{t : αit ≥ r} ∈ T (2.3)
is a.s. finite, then τ i is optimal and in fact the minimal solution of (2.2);
cf. [28, Lemma 2.1]. The solution is unique for instance if αi is strictly
1Increase is to be understood in the non-strict sense throughout the paper.
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increasing, but not in general. We assume that agents choose (2.3) in the
case of non-uniqueness, which can be motivated e.g. as a preference for early
stopping when other things are equal. This convention is not essential, but
simplifies our exposition and allows us to focus on multiplicity of equilibria
due to inherent game-theoretic aspects as it avoids ambiguity at the individ-
ual agents’ level.
The processes αi will depend on the proportion ρ(t) of players who have
already stopped, thus inducing an interaction among the agents. Since
given ρ, the optimal stopping times are completely determined by (2.3),
we shall simply say that an equilibrium is a process ρ which is G-adapted
and such that
ρ(t) = λ{i : τ i ≤ t},
where it is tacitly assumed that the above set is λ-measurable.
3 The n-Player Game
In this section, we formulate the n-player version of the “toy model” mean
field game in [28, Section 4]. Indeed, fix n ∈ N and take I = {1, . . . , n} to be
a set with n elements, equipped with the normalized counting measure. Each
player i observes an idiosyncratic signal Y it ≥ 0 which is right-continuous,
progressively measurable, increasing and such that {Y i}i∈I are pairwise i.i.d.
with the common c.d.f.
y 7→ Ft(y) := P{Y it ≤ y}.
Moreover, for a fixed interaction constant2 c > 0,
αi(t) = Y it + cρ
−i
n (t), where ρ
−i
n (t) =
#{j 6= i : τ j ≤ t}
n
is the fraction of other players3 (from the perspective of i) that have already
stopped, according to (τ j)j 6=i. Specializing from the previous section, an n-
player equilibrium boils down to the process ρn(t) = #{j : τ j ≤ t}/n where
2We could more generally consider processes αi which are nonlinear functions of Y i
and ρ−i and possibly a common noise, as in [28]. However, the increased generality does
not seem to lead to additional insights regarding the main questions of this paper, so we
have chosen to use the simplified “toy model” in our exposition. The constant c could
in fact be normalized to 1 by changing Y i and r, but we find it useful to represent the
strength of interaction explicitly.
3Once again, we have decided to exclude player i in order to focus on the game-
theoretic aspect of multiplicity. If player i considers her own action; i.e., uses ρ instead of
ρ−i, non-uniqueness can occur without other agents’ involvement simply because of the
direct feedback on the state process.
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τ j are as in (2.3). In particular, if ρn is an equilibrium and (t, ω) is such that
ρn(t)(ω) = k/n, then as the stopping times satisfy τ i = inf{t : αi(t) ≥ r},
we must have4
#{Y it (ω) + c
k − 1
n
≥ r} = k and #{Y it (ω) + c
k
n
< r} = n− k. (3.1)
This condition is also sufficient, in the sense made precise in Remark 3.5.
Next, we sketch the structure of all equilibria ρn(t) = #{i : τ i ≤ t}/n of
this game by a recursive construction, starting with K = ∅.
1. Suppose that at a given stopping time t0, a group K ( I of agents
has already stopped. Then every remaining agent i /∈ K examines her
criterion
θiK = inf{t : Y it + c
#K
n
≥ r}.
If θiK ≤ t0, then player i must stop immediately. We add i to the set
K and repeat Step 1 until no further players are forced to stop. (By
the monotonicity in #K, it does not matter in which order the agents
are processed.)
2. Beyond individual players forced to stop, a group J ⊆ Kc of agents
may be able to “coordinate” and stop together.5 Indeed, suppose that
θJK = inf{t : Y it + c
#K + #J − 1
n
≥ r}
satisfies θJK ≤ t0 for all i ∈ J . Then it is optimal for all these agents to
stop as a group, and they may or may not “choose” to do so. If they
stop, we add J to K and repeat the procedure starting with Step 1.
3. After all remaining groups of agents have decided whether to stop at
time t0, we increment time until there exists a group or individual
agent wanting to stop, and start again at Step 1.
The multiplicity of equilibria of this game arises because of the choices
taken by the groups J in Step 2, as well as the order in which the groups
are processed. Next, we describe two of these equilibria in detail. The first
one is the minimal equilibrium and corresponds to groups J in Step 2 always
choosing not to stop. This is equivalent to all players remaining in the game
until their own optimality criterion forces them to quit.
4We will often abbreviate #{i ∈ I : . . . } to #{. . . } in what follows.
5While we are using suggestive language here, it should be noted that these are simply
different configurations which may be equilibria. We are not trying to model a mechanism
how players “find” an equilibrium.
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Proposition 3.1. There exists an n-player equilibrium ρmn such that
ρmn (t) =
k
n
⇐⇒

#{Y it + c
k
n
≥ r} = k
#{Y it + c
k − l
n
≥ r} ≥ k − l + 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
(3.2)
This equilibrium is minimal; i.e., ρmn (t) ≤ ρn(t) for any n-player equilib-
rium ρn.
Proof. The construction is iterative. Given a set K ( I corresponding to
players who have already stopped, we can consider for all i /∈ K the stopping
times
θiK = inf{t : Y it + c
#K
n
≥ r}
with the corresponding order statistics θ(1)K ≤ θ(2)K ≤ . . . . We define θK = θ(1)K
and iK = (1). We note that agent imust stop at θiK , even if no further agents
j /∈ K choose to stop, and that iK is the first of the agents i /∈ K subject to
this event.
To define the equilibrium, start with K0 = ∅ and set τ i = θK0 ≡ θ(1)K0 on
{i = iK0}. Next, set K1 = {iK0} and τ i = max{θK1 , θK0} on {i = iK1}, and
continue inductively settingKk = Kk−1∪{iKk−1} and τ i = max{θKk , τ iKk−1}
on {i = iKk} for k = 2, . . . , n − 1. (The maximum needs to be taken since
all the αj are increased after player iKk−1 stops.)
Setting ρmn (t) = #{i : τ i ≤ t}/n, we have by construction that ρmn is an
equilibrium with corresponding optimal stopping times (τ i) and that (3.2)
holds.
To see the minimality, let ρn be any n-player equilibrium and consider
(t, ω) such that ρn(t)(ω) = k/n. Let k′ be such that ρmn (t)(ω) = k′/n. If we
had k′ > k, then (3.2) would imply #{Y it (ω) + c kn ≥ r} ≥ k + 1 and hence
#{Y it (ω) + c kn < r} ≤ n− k − 1, a contradiction to (3.1). Thus, k′ ≤ k and
we have shown that ρmn ≤ ρn.
Remark 3.2. Let ρ be an n-player equilibrium and t0 a stopping time.
There exists an equilibrium which is minimal among all n-player equilibria %
such that % = ρ on [0, t0]. Indeed, it is obtained by agents stopping as in ρ
until t0, whereas from t0 onwards we apply the construction in the proof of
Proposition 3.1 starting with K = {i : τ i ≤ t0}. We call this % the minimal
extension of ρ after t0.
The second extremal equilibrium is maximal and corresponds to players
coordinating their actions such as to stop as early as possible. As seen in
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the construction below, this is equivalent to all players constantly seeking
(maximally large) groups of collaborators so that immediate simultaneous
stopping is optimal for all agents in the group.
Proposition 3.3. There exists an n-player equilibrium ρMn such that
ρMn (t) =
k
n
⇐⇒

#{Y it + c
k − 1
n
≥ r} = k
#{Y it + c
k + l − 1
n
≥ r} ≤ k + l − 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ n− k.
(3.3)
This equilibrium is maximal; i.e., ρMn (t) ≥ ρn(t) for any n-player equilib-
rium ρn.
Proof. Given a set K ( I of size k = #K corresponding to players who have
already stopped, we can consider for 1 ≤ l ≤ n− k the stopping times
θlK = inf{t : #{i /∈ K : Y it + c
k + l − 1
n
≥ r} ≥ l};
intuitively, this is the first time an additional group J of #J = l agents
can collectively stop. If θ(1)K ≤ · · · ≤ θ(n−k)K are the corresponding order
statistics (ties are split by assigning the lower rank to the larger index l),
pick l = (1) and let J = J(K) be the set of i /∈ K such that {Y i
θlK
}i∈J are
the l largest elements in {Y i
θlK
}i∈Kc ; we think of J as the l most pessimistic
agents remaining at time θlK and denote θK := θ
l
K .
To define the equilibrium, start with K0 = ∅ and set τ i = θ∅ for i ∈ J(∅).
Next, set K1 = J(∅) and τ i = θK1 for i ∈ J(K1), and continue inductively
with K2 = J(K1) ∪ K1. Setting ρMn (t) = #{i : τ i ≤ t}/n, we have by
construction that ρMn is an equilibrium with corresponding optimal stopping
times (τ i) and that (3.3) holds.
To see the maximality, let ρn be any n-player equilibrium and consider
(t, ω) such that ρn(t)(ω) = k/n. Again, ρn must satisfy (3.1). Let k′ be
such that ρMn (t)(ω) = k′/n. If we had k′ < k, then (3.3) would imply that
#{Y it (ω) + c k−1n ≥ r} ≤ k − 1, contradicting (3.1).
The following observations will be used in Section 6 when we construct
n-player equilibria converging to a given mean field equilibrium.
Remark 3.4. (i) Consider n-player equilibria ρ and ρ′, a stopping time t0
and assume that ρ(t0) ≤ ρ′(t0). Then there exists an n-player equilibrium %
such that
%1[0,t0) = ρ1[0,t0) and %1[t0,∞) = ρ
′1[t0,∞).
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Indeed, let I0 be the set of agents that have stopped by time t0 in equi-
librium ρ and let I1 be the analogue for ρ′. By (2.3) we necessarily have
I0 ⊆ I1. The equilibrium % is obtained by following the stopping times of
ρ on [0, t0). At t0, all agents in the group J = I1 \ I0 stop (and this must
be optimal as ρ′ is an equilibrium). After that the remaining agents act as
in ρ′.
(ii) Extending the above, consider n-player equilibria ρ and ρ′, stopping
times t0 ≤ t1 and assume that ρ(t0) ≤ ρ′(t1). Then there exists an n-player
equilibrium % such that
%1[0,t0) = ρ1[0,t0) and %1[t1,∞) = ρ
′1[t1,∞). (3.4)
Indeed, let ρ1 be the minimal extension of ρ after t0 (cf. Remark 3.2). Let I0
be the set of agents that have stopped by time t0 in equilibrium ρ and let I1
be the set of agents that have stopped by time t1 in equilibrium ρ′. Again, we
observe that I0 ⊆ I1, due to (2.3) and the increase of Y i. Moreover, I1 must
include all agents that stop in the construction of the minimal extension on
[t0, t1]. As a result, ρ1(t1) ≤ ρ′(t1), and now the claim follows by applying (i).
(iii) A last generalization is that when ρ(t0) ≤ ρ′(t1) merely holds on
some set A ∈ Gt1 , then we can still construct an n-player equilibrium %
satisfying (3.4) on A. Indeed, % is found as in (ii) except that on Ac, agents
continue to stop according to ρ1 after t1.
Remark 3.5. (i) The necessary condition (3.1) is sufficient in the follow-
ing sense. Fix n and a stopping time t0, and suppose there exists an Gt0-
measurable random variable k satisfying (3.1) at t0; i.e.,
#{Y it0 + c
k − 1
n
≥ r} = k and #{Y it0 + c
k
n
< r} = n− k.
Then there exists an n-player equilibrium % such that %(t0) = k/n.
To construct %, let agents stop as in the minimal equilibrium ρmn up to
time t0. By the argument at the end of the proof of Proposition 3.1, we must
have ρmn (t0) ≤ k/n. At t0, all remaining agents i with Y it0+c k−1n ≥ r stop, so
that ρ(t0) = k/n. After that, the remaining agents follow the construction
in the proof of Proposition 3.1 starting with K = {i : τ i ≤ t0}.
(ii) A variant of this holds when (3.1) is satisfied on some set A ∈ Gt0 ,
with the conclusion that %(t0) = k/n holds only on A. Indeed, we construct
% as above on A, whereas on Ac we use ρmn .
(iii) For later use, we observe that if this construction is applied for two
times t0 ≤ t1 and corresponding random variables k0 ≤ k1, the resulting
equilibria satisfy %0 ≤ %1.
10
4 The Mean Field Game
The game considered in this section is the “toy model” mean field game of [28,
Section 4]. Indeed, (I, I, λ) is an atomless probability space and we work on a
so-called Fubini extension (I×Ω,Σ, µ) of the product (I×Ω, I×G, λ×P ); see
[28, Section 3]. For each i ∈ I, let Y it ≥ 0 be a right-continuous, increasing,
G-progressively measurable process such that for each t ≥ 0, (i, ω) 7→ Y it (ω)
is Σ-measurable and Y it , i ∈ I are λ-essentially pairwise i.i.d.; see also [28,
Definition 3.1]. Working on a Fubini extension ensures that such processes
exist, as well as the validity of an Exact Law of Large Numbers. In all that
follows, we assume that the c.d.f. y 7→ Ft(y) = P{Y it ≤ y} is continuous.
Since λ is atomless, each individual agent has zero mass and hence does
not influence the state process ρ(t) = λ{i : τ i ≤ t}. In particular, we do
not distinguish ρ and ρ−i and simply set αi(t) = Y it + cρ(t). We recall that
ρ is an equilibrium if ρ(t) = λ{i : τ i ≤ t} where τ i is as in (2.3) for λ-a.e.
i ∈ I. Such a process may be random (see also [28]). However, as common in
the mean field game literature, we pay special attention to equilibria which
are deterministic due to the infinite number of players.6 The following is
an improved version of [28, Proposition 4.1] with necessary and sufficient
conditions.
Proposition 4.1. A real function ρ : R+ → [0, 1] is a mean field game
equilibrium if and only if it is increasing, right-continuous and
ρ(t) + Ft(r − cρ(t)) = 1, t ≥ 0. (4.1)
Proof. Suppose that ρ is a mean field game equilibrium, then ρ is clearly
increasing. Since Y it , i ∈ I are λ-essentially pairwise i.i.d., the Exact Law of
Large Numbers (e.g., [28, Section 3]) states that λ{i : Y it ≤ u} = Ft(u) for
all u. Using also (2.3) and that y 7→ Ft(y) is continuous, we have
ρ(t) = λ{i : τ i ≤ t} = λ{i : Y it + cρ(t+) ≥ r} = 1− Ft(r − cρ(t+)). (4.2)
Recall that Y i has right-continuous paths. Using again the continuity of Ft,
this implies that
(t, u) 7→ Ft(r − cu) is jointly right-continuous. (4.3)
6Note that the key message of this paper, namely that some mean field equilibria
are not limits of n-player equilibria, is only amplified if more mean field equilibria are
considered.
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It follows that t 7→ 1− Ft(r − cρ(t+)) is right-continuous, and thus the left-
hand side of (4.2) must also be right-continuous. That is, ρ(t) = ρ(t+), and
then (4.2) becomes (4.1).
Conversely, suppose that ρ is a function with the stated properties. Defin-
ing the corresponding optimal stopping times τ i as in (2.3), the Exact Law
of Large Number shows that
λ{i : τ i ≤ t} = λ{i : Y it + cρ(t) ≥ r} = 1− Ft(r − cρ(t)) = ρ(t);
that is, ρ is an equilibrium.
The following notions will be crucial in determining the convergence to
the mean field limit.
Definition 4.2. Fix t ≥ 0. A solution u ∈ [0, 1] of u + Ft(r − cu) = 1 is
called left-increasing-transversal (or left-transversal for short) if
for all ε > 0 there is u′ ∈ (u− ε, u) such that u′ + Ft(r − cu′) < 1 (4.4)
and right-increasing-transversal (or right-transversal) if
for all ε > 0 there is u′ ∈ (u, u+ ε) such that u′ + Ft(r − cu′) > 1. (4.5)
It is called increasing-transversal if both (4.4) and (4.5) hold, and decreasing-
transversal if these hold with the inequality signs reversed.
For instance, in Figure 2, um is left-increasing-transversal and umrt, uM
are right-increasing-transversal, but only uMlt is increasing-transversal. A
decreasing-transversal solution is also depicted. Next, we introduce a quartet
of solutions that will be important in Section 5.
u
0 1
u+ Ft(r − cu)
um
umrt
uMlt
uM
Figure 2: Solutions um, umrt, uMlt and uM
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Lemma 4.3. Fix t ≥ 0. The equation u+Ft(r−cu) = 1 has a minimal solu-
tion um ∈ [0, 1], a maximal solution uM ∈ [0, 1], a minimal right-transversal
solution umrt ∈ [0, 1], and a maximal left-transversal solution uMlt ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Since G(u) := u+ Ft(r − cu) < 1 for u < 0 and G(u) > 1 for u > 1,
the existence of um and uM is immediate from the continuity of G. The fact
that G(u) < 1 for all u < um entails that um is left-transversal, and since it
follows directly from the definition that the set of left-transversal solutions
is stable under increasing limits, it follows that uMlt exists. The argument
for umrt is similar.
As illustrated in Figure 2, these four solutions may be distinct, and while
um is automatically left-transversal, it can happen that umrt is not. Similarly
for uM and uMlt. We can also note that umrt ≤ uMlt may fail, say if the
graph is replaced by a flat stretch on [um, uM ]. But in more generic cases,
and in particular whenever um and uM are not local extrema, the quartet
describes at most two distinct solutions um = umrt ≤ uMlt = uM and these
are then increasing-transversal.
In view of Lemma 4.3 we may define, given t ≥ 0,
ρm(t) = um, ρM (t) = uM , ρmrt(t) = umrt, ρMlt(t) = uMlt. (4.6)
Using the increase of Yt and (4.3), one can check that ρm, ρM , ρmrt, ρMlt
are increasing, ρM and ρmrt are right-continuous, and ρm and ρMlt are left-
continuous (but not continuous in general).
Corollary 4.4. (i) If ρ : R+ → [0, 1] is any increasing function such
that (4.1) holds, then ρ(t+) is an equilibrium.
(ii) The functions t 7→ ρm(t+) and t 7→ ρM (t) are the minimal and
maximal equilibria of the mean field game; i.e., they are equilibria and any
other equilibrium ρ satisfies ρm(t+) ≤ ρ(t) ≤ ρM (t) for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. (i) If ρ is any increasing function such that (4.1) holds, then the joint
right-continuity in (4.3) implies that ρ(t+)+Ft(r−cρ(t+)) = 1 for all t ≥ 0.
It now follows from Proposition 4.1 that ρ(t+) is an equilibrium.
(ii) Both ρm(t+) and ρM (t) are equilibria by (i). If ρ is any equilibrium,
then it is necessarily right-continuous by Proposition 4.1 and thus ρm ≤ ρ ≤
ρM implies ρm(t+) ≤ ρ(t) ≤ ρM (t) for all t ≥ 0.
5 Convergence to Extremal Equilibria
The main goal of the last two sections is to understand which mean field
equilibria are limits of n-player equilibria. In brief, we will see that mean
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field equilibria described by increasing-transversal solutions of (4.1) (on a
sufficiently large sets of times t) are such limits, whereas other equilibria
need not be proper limits of n-player equilibria; they merely occur as parts
of mixtures which are limits.
In this section, we focus on the convergence to the minimal and maximal
mean field equilibria; the less straightforward interior case is treated in the
next section. As a first step, we relate limits of arbitrary n-player equilibria
to mean field equilibria at a fixed time. We will see in Example 5.8 that
such limits need not be deterministic mean field equilibria as defined in the
preceding section, hence the following result relates limits to mixtures of
equilibria. This is in line with the results of [13, 22] stating that n-player
equilibria converge to “weak” equilibria of the mean field game, while also
illustrating that randomization can indeed occur in a quite natural example.
Given a closed set A ⊆ R, we say that a sequence (ξn) of random variables
is asymptotically concentrated on A if limn→∞ P (ξn ∈ Aε) = 1 for all ε > 0,
where Aε = {x ∈ R : d(x,A) < ε} is the open ε-neighborhood of A. When
(ξn) is uniformly bounded, as it will be the case below, this is equivalent to
any weak cluster point of (ξn) being concentrated on A. Moreover, for t ≥ 0,
we denote the solutions of (4.1) by
U(t) = {u ∈ [0, 1] : u+ Ft(r − cu) = 1}.
Proposition 5.1. Fix t ≥ 0 and let (ρn)n≥1 be a sequence of n-player equi-
libria. Then ρn(t) is asymptotically concentrated on U(t).
Proof. We first show that for any interval [u0, u1] ⊆ [0, 1] such that u 7→
u+ Ft(r − cu) is strictly smaller than 1 on [u0, u1],
P (u0 + ε
′ ≤ ρn(t) ≤ u1 − ε′)→ 0 for all ε′ > 0. (5.1)
Indeed, let u0 < u1 be as above. By increasing the value of u1 if necessary,
we may assume without loss of generality that u 7→ u + Ft(r − cu) attains
its maximum over [u0, u1] at u1. Given 0 < ε < u1− u0, we can then choose
by continuity some u ∈ (u1 − ε, u1) such that
u′ + Ft(r − cu′) ≤ u+ Ft(r − cu) < 1 for all u0 ≤ u′ ≤ u. (5.2)
Furthermore, setting
εn(x) =
#{Y it + cx ≥ r}
n
− (1− Ft(r − cx)), x ∈ R
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and εn = supx∈R{|εn(x)|}, we have εn → 0 a.s. by the uniform convergence
in the Glivenko–Cantelli theorem. Let Xi = 1{Y it +cu≥r}, then
X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
= 1− Ft(r − cu) + εn(u). (5.3)
Denote by [x] the largest integer k ≤ x. For any [u0n] + 1 ≤ l ≤ [un], let
Z li = 1{Y it +c ln≥r}, then similarly
Z l1 + · · ·+ Z ln
n
= 1− Ft(r − c ln) + εn( ln).
On the event {Z l1 + · · ·+ Z ln = l}, we then have
1 + εn(
l
n) =
l
n
+ Ft(r − c ln) ≤ u+ Ft(r − cu)
by (5.2) and thus
X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
= 1− Ft(r − cu) + εn(u) ≤ u− εn( ln) + εn(u) ≤ u+ 2εn.
Combining this observation with (3.1), we have for all [u0n] + 1 ≤ l ≤ [un]
that {
ρn(t) =
l
n
}
⊆
{
#
{
Y it + c
l
n ≥ r
}
= l
}
=
{Z l1 + · · ·+ Z ln
n
=
l
n
}
⊆
{X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
≤ u+ 2εn
}
.
Hence, { [u0n] + 1
n
≤ ρn(t) ≤ [un]
n
}
⊆
{X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
≤ u+ 2εn
}
and thus
P
( [u0n] + 1
n
≤ ρn(t) ≤ [un]
n
)
≤ P
(X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
≤ u+ 2εn
)
= P
(
u+ Ft(r − cu) ≥ 1− 2εn + εn(u)
)
→ 0
by (5.3) and (5.2). Since ε > 0 was arbitrary, this shows (5.1).
In a symmetric way, one can show the analogue of (5.1) for intervals
where u 7→ u + Ft(r − cu) is strictly larger than 1. Since for any ε > 0 the
complement of U(t)ε consists of finitely many intervals of one of these two
types, the claim follows.
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Next, we narrow down the asymptotic support for the minimal and max-
imal n-player equilibria ρmn and ρMn . We will see in Section 5.1 that the
following result is optimal and the limiting support is not a singleton in
general. We recall the notation introduced in (4.6).
Lemma 5.2. Fix t ≥ 0.
(i) The minimal n-player equilibrium ρmn (t) is asymptotically concentrated
on [ρm(t), ρmrt(t)] ∩ U(t).
(ii) The maximal n-player equilibrium ρMn (t) is asymptotically concentrated
on [ρMlt(t), ρM (t)] ∩ U(t).
Proof. (i) In view of Proposition 5.1 and the definition of ρm(t), it suffices
to show that
P (ρmn (t) ≥ ρmrt(t) + ε′)→ 0 for all ε′ > 0. (5.4)
Let ε > 0. As ρmrt(t) is right-transversal we can find u ∈ (ρmrt(t), ρmrt(t)+ε)
such that 1 − Ft(r − cu) < u. For n large enough, we then have ρmrt(t) <
[un]/n ≤ u. Let Xi = 1{Y it +cu≥r}, then
X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
→ EXi = 1− Ft(r − cu) a.s.
by the Law of Large Numbers. Hence,
X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
− [un]
n
→ 1− Ft(r − cu)− u < 0 a.s.
Using also (3.2), we conclude that
P (ρmn (t) ≥ u) ≤ P
(
ρmn (t) ≥
[un]
n
)
≤ P
(
#
{
Y it + c
[un]
n
≥ r} ≥ [un])
≤ P
(#{Y it + cu ≥ r}
n
≥ [un]
n
)
= P
(X1 + · · ·+Xn
n
− [un]
n
≥ 0
)
→ 0.
As ε > 0 was arbitrary, the above implies (5.4).
(ii) The arguments are similar to (i) and therefore omitted.
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Next, we introduce an appropriate notion of convergence for dynamic
equilibria as required for our main results. Note that given an increas-
ing function, its right- and left-continuous limits (and all functions between
these) differ only by the allocation of the function value at the (countably
many) jumps. The fact that mean field equilibria are right-continuous, cf.
Proposition 4.1, reflects the fact that agents stopping at time t are counted
as having left the game at time t, whereas left-continuity would correspond
to counting them as leaving immediately after t. Since this difference is
not fundamental, it seems reasonable to consider limits “up to taking right-
continuous versions.” This has been accomplished by notions of so-called
Fatou convergence, e.g. [21, 31], in other areas of stochastic analysis.
For increasing functions ϕn, ϕ on R+, we have that (lim infn ϕn)(t+) =
(lim supn ϕn)(t+) = ϕ(t+) holds for all t ∈ R+ if and only if limϕn(t) = ϕ(t)
for all t in a dense subset D ⊆ R+. This motivates the following.
Definition 5.3. A sequence (ρn)n≥1 of n-player equilibria Fatou converges
in probability to a mean field equilibrium ρ if there exists a dense set D ⊆ R+
such that ρn(t)→ ρ(t) in probability for all t ∈ D.
We note that by a diagonalization procedure, Fatou convergence in proba-
bility implies Fatou convergence a.s. along a subsequence (nk), where the a.s.
convergence is defined by direct analogy to the above. In particular, it then
follows that the right-continuous versions of lim infk ρnk and lim supk ρnk
coincide with ρ a.s.
With these notions in place, we can establish the convergence of extremal
equilibria in the increasing-transversal case. (Note that the extremal equilib-
ria cannot be decreasing-transversal; they are either increasing-transversal
or tangential.)
Theorem 5.4. Suppose that for all t in a dense subset D ⊆ R+, the minimal
solution u ∈ [0, 1] of u + Ft(r − cu) = 1 is increasing-transversal. Then the
minimal n-player equilibria ρmn Fatou converge in probability to the minimal
mean field equilibrium as n→∞.
The analogous assertion holds for the maximal equilibria ρMn .
Proof. By the hypothesis, ρm(t) = ρmrt(t) for t ∈ D. Thus, Lemma 5.2
implies that lim ρmn (t) = ρm(t) = ρmrt(t) in probability for t ∈ D. The
analogue holds for ρMn .
Next, we discuss the transversality condition in more detail. In fact, if
uniqueness holds for the mean field game, the condition is automatically
satisfied and we conclude the following.
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Corollary 5.5. The following are equivalent:
(i) the mean field game has a unique equilibrium ρ,
(ii) the equation u+ Ft(r − cu) = 1, u ∈ [0, 1] has a unique solution for a
dense set of t ∈ R+.
In that case, any sequence (ρn)n≥1 of n-player equilibria Fatou converges in
probability to ρ.
Proof. If (i) holds, then ρm(t+) = ρM (t) for all t ≥ 0 by Corollary 4.4,
and (ii) follows since ρm(t+) = ρm(t) except at the (countably many) jumps
of ρm. The converse holds because equilibria are right-continuous; cf. Propo-
sition 4.1. Finally, if u+ Ft(r − cu) = 1 has a unique solution, this solution
is necessarily increasing-transversal since u + Ft(r − cu) < 1 for u < 0 and
u+ Ft(r − cu) > 1 for u > 1.
While we will see below that the transversality condition in Theorem 5.4
cannot be dropped, we can argue that this condition holds for a generic choice
of signals Y i. More generally, we discuss the following hypothesis (again,
note that the extremal solutions can never be decreasing-transversal).
Definition 5.6. We say that Hypothesis (H) holds if for all t in a dense
subset of R+, any solution of u ∈ [0, 1] of u + Ft(r − cu) = 1 is increasing-
transversal or decreasing-transversal.
While this hypothesis does not hold for all choices of Y i, the exceptional
set is small in the sense that a “typical” Ft will not have a local extremum
of u 7→ u + Ft(r − cu) at a solution of u + Ft(r − cu) = 1, so that the
latter must be transversal. As t varies over R+, the non-transversal case is
somewhat more likely to occur, but typically at only finitely many t so that
the hypothesis still holds. There seems to be no obvious way to quantify this.
However, we state the following result which confirms the general intuition
and shows that Hypothesis (H) is always valid after a small perturbation
of Y i.
Proposition 5.7. For every δ > 0 there exists 0 ≤ ε ≤ δ such that after
replacing Y it with Y it + ε, Hypothesis (H) is satisfied.
Proof. Let us first observe that for any real function f(x), the set of local
minimum values S = {f(x) : x is a local minimum of f} is countable.
Indeed, for every s ∈ S there is an open interval Is with rational endpoints
such that s = min{f(x) : x ∈ Is}. If s, t ∈ S and Is = It, then s = t,
showing that I : S → Q×Q is injective.
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For fixed t ≥ 0, denote by S(t) the set of all local minimum and maximum
values of u 7→ u + Ft(r − cu) − 1, then ∪t∈QS(t) is again countable. Thus,
we can find a sequence ak ↓ 0 with ak /∈ ∪t∈Q+S(t). Set εk = cak. Then,
passing from Yt to Y εkt = Yt + εk, the function under consideration is
u 7→ u+F εkt (r−cu) = u+Ft(r−cu−εk) = (u+ak)+Ft(r−c(u+ak))−ak.
By the construction of ak, we know that 1 is not a local extremum value
of this function. However, if a solution of u + F εkt (r − cu) = 1 failed to be
transversal, then 1 would be the value at a local extremum.
5.1 Counterexamples
In this section, we illustrate that the assertion of Theorem 5.4 may fail with-
out the transversality condition, and more generally that the intervals in
Lemma 5.2 cannot be improved. The examples presented here are essen-
tially static, meaning that Y it does not depend on t. For purely technical
reasons, namely to ensure the finiteness of the optimal stopping times (2.3)
as assumed throughout, we introduce a time horizon T ∈ (0,∞) at which Y it
jumps to a value larger than r, thus ensuring that all players stop.
In the first example, we allow for atoms in the distribution of Y it to obtain
an analytically tractable example. We argue below that the atoms are not
essential to the observed phenomenon.
Example 5.8. Let r = c = 1 and let Y it = Y i0 , 0 ≤ t < T be constant i.i.d.
processes such that Law(Y it ) =
1
2δ 12
+ 12δ2 for all 0 ≤ t < T , and set Y it = 2
for t ≥ T . Then the law of the minimal n-player equilibrium ρmn (t) converges
to 12δ 12 +
1
2δ1 for all 0 ≤ t < T .
Proof. Proposition 3.1 yields two cases for every ω. If strictly less than n/2
of the realizations {Y i0 (ω), i = 1, . . . , n} equal 2, all players i with Y i0 (ω) = 2
stop at t = 0 and those with Y i0 (ω) = 1/2 never stop. Whereas if n/2 or
more of the realizations equal 2, then all agents stop at t = 0. It follows that
the law of ρmn (t) ≡ ρmn (0) converges to 12δ 12 +
1
2δ1 as n→∞.
The limit law 12δ 12 +
1
2δ1 can be seen as a mixture of the deterministic
mean field equilibria ρm(t) ≡ 12 and ρmrt(t) ≡ 1. In fact, with an appro-
priate definition allowing for randomized equilibria, this mixture is itself an
equilibrium. However, a remarkable conclusion is that there are no n-player
equilibria converging to the minimal equilibrium ρm.
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Figure 3: Graphs of Ft(1− u) (solid) and 1− u (dashed)
Corollary 5.9. In the context of Example 5.8, ρm(t) is not a weak accumu-
lation point of n-player equilibria, for any 0 ≤ t < T .
Proof. Suppose that there exists a subsequence ρk = ρnk of nk-player equi-
libria such that ρk(t) → ρ(t) = 1/2 weakly. Then ρk(t) ≥ ρmk (t) and
Law(ρmk (t))→ 12δ 12 +
1
2δ1 yield a contradiction.
It may be useful to contrast this with the fact that ρm is a limit of
approximate Nash equilibria. To wit, if all players i with Y i0 (ω) = 2 stop at
t = 0 whereas those with Y i0 (ω) = 1/2 do not stop until T , we obtain an
approximate Nash equilibrium converging to ρm as n→∞.
The following example is a smooth version of Example 5.8 where Y it
admits a density; see also Figure 3(b). It is not analytically tractable but
the qualitative behavior is the same.
Example 5.10. Let r = c = 1 and let Y it = Y i0 , 0 ≤ t < T be i.i.d. processes
such that the law of Y it has the density ft(y) = 41[ 3
8
, 1
2
](y) + 1[ 3
2
,2](y) for all
0 ≤ t < T , and let Y it = 2 +Xi, t ≥ T , where Xi are i.i.d. with a continuous
distribution on [0, 1]. Then the simulation of ρmn (t), cf. Figure 4(a), shows
that ρmn (t) again converges to
1
2δ 12
+ 12δ1 for 0 ≤ t < T which is again a
mixture of the deterministic mean field equilibria ρm(t) ≡ 12 and ρmrt(t) ≡ 1.
In the third example, the mean field game admits a continuum of solu-
tions; see also Figure 3(c).
Example 5.11. Consider the setting of Example 5.10 with density ft(y) =
1[0, 1
2
](y) + 1[ 3
2
,2](y). In this case, we again have ρ
m(t) ≡ 12 and ρmrt(t) ≡ 1,
but now all values in between also correspond to mean field equilibria. The
simulation of ρmn (t), cf. Figure 4(b), illustrates that the law of ρmn (t) converges
to a mixture of all these equilibria.
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Figure 4: Simulations for n-player minimal equilibria (n = 10′000). Lo-
cations k/n of equilibria with k stopped players on the x-axis, number of
samples with that equilibrium on the y-axis.
When the minimal mean field equilibrium is not increasing-transversal,
the preceding examples illustrate that it need not be the limit of the minimal
n-player equilibria. The final example shows that both cases are possible: it
may be the limit even if it is not increasing-transversal.
Example 5.12. Consider the setting of Example 5.10 with density ft(y) =
21[1/2,1](y). In this case, we easily compute that ρm(t) ≡ 0 and ρmrt(t) ≡ 1.
Nevertheless, ρmn (t) ≡ 0 due to Y it < r a.s., and thus ρmn (t)→ ρm(t).
6 Convergence to General Equilibria
Theorem 5.4 shows that if the minimal and maximal mean field equilib-
ria are increasing-transversal (on a dense set), then they are the limits of
the minimal and maximal n-player equilibria. Indeed, the latter are obvi-
ous candidates for sequences converging to these mean field equilibria. For
mean field equilibria that are not extremal, there are no obvious candidates
for the approximating n-player equilibria. The following result shows that
increasing-transversal equilibria are still limits; however, the approximating
n-player equilibria have no simple description. We will see in Section 6.2
that the analogue for decreasing-transversal solutions fails.
6.1 Increasing-Transversal Equilibria
Theorem 6.1. Let ρ be a mean field equilibrium. Suppose that for all t
in a dense subset D ⊆ R+, the solution u := ρ(t) of u + Ft(r − cu) = 1
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is increasing-transversal. Then there exist n-player equilibria (ρn)n≥1 which
Fatou converge in probability to ρ as n→∞.
The first step of the proof is to solve a static version of the problem. This
will be accomplished by a fixed point argument for monotone functions.
Lemma 6.2. Let t ≥ 0, let u ∈ [0, 1] be an increasing-transversal solution
of u + Ft(r − cu) = 1 and let ε, δ > 0. There are n0 ∈ N and A ∈ Gt with
P (A) > 1− ε such that for all n ≥ n0 and ω ∈ A, there exists k(ω) ∈ N such
that |u− k(ω)/n| ≤ δ and (3.1) holds; i.e.,
#{Y it (ω)+c
k(ω)− 1
n
≥ r} = k(ω) and #{Y it (ω)+c
k(ω)
n
< r} = n−k(ω).
Moreover, k(ω) can be chosen as a measurable function of Y 1t (ω), . . . , Y nt (ω).
Proof. Since u is increasing-transversal, there are points u0, u1 ∈ R such that
u− δ/2 ≤ u0 < u < u1 ≤ u+ δ/2 and
u0 < 1− Ft(r − cu0) ≤ 1− Ft(r − cu1) < u1,
where the inequality in the middle is due to the monotonicity of Ft. The
Glivenko–Cantelli theorem then implies that the event An consisting of all ω
such that
[nu0] ≤ #{Y it (ω) + c
[nu0]− 1
n
≥ r} ≤ #{Y it (ω) + c
[nu1]
n
≥ r} ≤ [nu1]
satisfies P (An) → 1. For fixed n and ω ∈ An, consider the integer-valued
function
k 7→ G(k) := #{Y it (ω) + c kn ≥ r}.
By the above, G maps {[nu0] − 1, [nu0], . . . , [nu1]} into {[nu0], . . . , [nu1]}.
Moreover, G is monotone increasing. Lemma 6.3 below then yields the ex-
istence of [nu0] ≤ k ≤ [nu1] such that G(k − 1) = G(k) = k which is
exactly (3.1). By the choice of u0, u1 we also have |u− k/n| ≤ δ for n large.
Moreover, it is clear from the proof of Lemma 6.3 that k is a measurable
function of Y 1t , . . . , Y nt .
Lemma 6.3. Let x0 < x1 < · · · < xN be real numbers for some N ≥ 1. Let
J = {x1, . . . , xN} and J0 = {x0} ∪ J . If f : J0 → J is monotone increasing,
there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that f(xk−1) = f(xk) = xk.
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Proof. Since f is monotone and maps J into J , it must have a fixed point
in J . We claim that the minimal k ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that f(xk) = xk has the
desired property. Indeed, if k = 1, monotonicity implies that f(x0) = f(x1)
and the proof is complete. If k > 1, we observe that f(xl−1) ≥ xl for all
1 ≤ l ≤ k. Indeed, f(x1) ≥ x2 since x1 is not a fixed point, but then
f(x2) ≥ x3 since x2 is not a fixed point and f is monotone, and so on. In
particular, f(xk−1) ≥ xk and thus f(xk−1) = f(xk) = xk.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Fix N ∈ N and let t1 < · · · < tN be in D. For n large
enough, Lemma 6.2 allows us to find sets Al ∈ Gtl with P (Al) > 1 − N−2
and random variables kl satisfying |ρ(tl)−kl/n| ≤ δ := 1/N and (3.1) on Al,
for 1 ≤ l ≤ N .
Following Remark 3.5, we can construct n-player equilibria ρln such that
ρln(tl) = kl/n on Al. Next, we argue that these ρln can be chosen such that
ρ1n(t1) ≤ · · · ≤ ρmn (tm) on A1 ∩ · · · ∩Am, 1 ≤ m ≤ N. (6.1)
Indeed, we have ρ(tl) ≤ ρ(tl+1) by the increase of ρ. If ρ(tl) < ρ(tl+1),
then we can ensure ρln(tl) ≤ ρl+1n (tl+1) on Al ∩ Al+1 simply by choosing
δ < |ρ(tl) − ρ(tl+1)|/2 in Lemma 6.2. If ρ(tl) = ρ(tl+1), we can observe
that if the construction in the proof of Lemma 6.2 is executed twice with
tl and tl+1, then by choosing the same parameters u0, u1 the corresponding
functions fl and fl+1 satisfy fl ≤ fl+1 due to the increase of Y i. This
implies that the corresponding minimal fixed points produced by the proof
of Lemma 6.3 satisfy ρln(tl) ≤ ρl+1n (tl+1).
In view of (6.1), we can use Remark 3.4(iii) to construct from the equi-
libria (ρln)1≤l≤N another n-player equilibrium %n with the property that
%n(tl) = ρ
l
n(tl) for all 1 ≤ l ≤ N on AN := ∩Nl=1Al.
To summarize, %n satisfies |ρ(tl) − %n(tl)| ≤ 1/N for all 1 ≤ l ≤ N on
the set AN which has probability P (AN ) ≥ 1 − N−1. By letting t1, . . . , tN
exhaust a countable dense subset D′ ⊆ D ⊆ R+ as N →∞, this shows that
there exist n-player equilibria (%n)n≥1 such that %n(t)→ ρ(t) in probability
for all t ∈ D′ and the proof is complete.
Remark 6.4. The construction leading to Theorem 6.1 is pathwise and thus
extends beyond deterministic mean field equilibria. For instance, let ρ1, ρ2
be such equilibria satisfying the assumption of Theorem 6.1, let λ ∈ [0, 1]
and suppose that the n-player game admits a set A ∈ G0 with P (A) = λ.
Then we can apply the construction separately on A and Ac to find n-player
equilibria ρn converging to the mixture λδρ1 + (1− λ)δρ2 on a dense set. In
the same vain, convergence to more general mixtures could be analyzed.
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6.2 Decreasing-Transversal Equilibria
Let us begin with a simulation and then establish that the observations
correspond to a general result.
0 1
1
0.5
Figure 5: C.d.f. and simulation of Example 6.5. The decreasing-transversal
equilibrium at 0.5 can only be approximated on 12.5% of the samples.
Example 6.5. Let r = c = 1 and let Y it = Y i0 , 0 ≤ t < T be constant
i.i.d. processes such that Law(Y it ) has the tent-shaped probability density
f(x) = 2− 4|x− 1/2|, x ∈ [0, 1]. As illustrated in Figure 5 (left panel), the
corresponding equation (4.1) has a decreasing-transversal solution at u = 1/2
and increasing-transversal solutions at u = 0 and u = 1. For the game with
n = 10′000 players, the histogram in Figure 5 shows the values of k/n such
that k satisfies the equilibrium conditions (3.1). The simulation illustrates
the convergence to the equilibria at u = 0, 1 as proved in Theorem 6.1 but
also suggests that u = 1/2 is not a limit of n-player equilibria; indeed, only
about 12.5% of the samples allow for an n-player equilibrium with k/n close
to 1/2. In Proposition 6.11, we will establish an asymptotic upper bound
which yields e−2 ≈ 13.5% in this example.
In the remainder of this section we assume that Ft admits a continuous
density ft. Let x ∈ [0, 1] be a solution of u+Ft(r−cu) = 1. We say that x is
strongly decreasing-transversal if ∂u|u=x[u+ Ft(r − cu)] < 0 or equivalently
ft(r − cx) > c−1.
We note that x is then necessarily in (0, 1) and decreasing-transversal in the
sense of Definition 4.2; the only difference (given the continuity assumption)
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is that we exclude the case where u+ Ft(r − cu) has a vanishing derivative
at x (see also Remark 6.10). Intuitively, when ft(r − cx) is large, there are
many similar agents (in terms of values of Y i and relative to the interaction
constant c) close to such a state. As a result, these agents may tend to
coordinate and either all stop or all not stop: it may be impossible to break
up the group7 and create an n-player equilibrium close to x.
Theorem 6.6. Let ρ be a mean field equilibrium and suppose that the set
{t ≥ 0 : ρ(t) is strongly decreasing-transversal}
has nonempty interior.8 Then there does not exist a sequence of n-player
equilibria ρn Fatou converging to ρ in probability.
This theorem follows from Corollary 6.8 below which shows non-existence
with positive probability at any fixed time t where ρ(t) is strongly decreasing-
transversal. For brevity, we set
Gn,t(k) = #{Y it + c kn ≥ r}
so that the n-player equilibrium conditions (3.1) can be expressed concisely
as Gn,t(k) = k = Gn,t(k − 1). Moreover, we introduce
Kn,t = {0 ≤ k ≤ n : Gn,t(k) = k = Gn,t(k − 1)}.
Roughly speaking, we think of Kn,t(ω) as the set of all k such that k/n =
ρn(t)(ω) for some n-player equilibrium ρn(t). (This is not quite meaningful
since equilibria can always be altered on nullsets.) More precisely, we have
that if ρn is a given equilibrium, then nρn(t) ∈ Kn,t a.s. by (3.1). In particu-
lar, we will use below that {|x− ρn(t)| < ε} ⊆ {∃ k ∈ Kn,t : |x− kn | < ε} a.s.
for all x ∈ [0, 1] and ε > 0. Finally, we also introduce the superset
K∗n,t = {0 ≤ k ≤ n : Gn,t(k) = k} ⊇ Kn,t
which has no direct interpretation in terms of our game but is conveniently
related to crossings of empirical distribution functions (see the proof below).
7Clearly, this intuition does not explain the phase-transition character of the phe-
nomenon. To gather the intuition for a large density, it may be useful to consider the
limiting case of an atom in Ft: all agents corresponding to the atom make the same
stopping decision.
8Note that the condition is nonempty interior rather than the set being nonempty.
This corresponds to the fact that convergence in probability on a dense set of times t is
sufficient for Fatou convergence; cf. Definition 5.3.
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Proposition 6.7. Fix t ≥ 0 and let x ∈ (0, 1) satisfy x + Ft(r − cx) = 1.
Let α := cft(r − cx) and assume that α > 1. Then
lim
ε→0
lim
n→∞P (∃ k ∈ K
∗
n,t : |x− kn | < ε) =
1− θ
α− 1 < 1
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is defined through θe−θ = αe−α.
Proof. We first observe the local nature of the claim. Indeed, introducing
the uniform random variables U i = Ft(Y it ) we see that the event
An,ε = {∃ k ∈ K∗n,t : |x− kn | < ε}
= {∃ 0 ≤ k ≤ n : #{Y it + c kn ≥ r} = k, |x− kn | < ε}
= {∃ 0 ≤ k ≤ n : #{U i ≥ Ft(r − c kn)} = k, |x− kn | < ε}
depends only on the values of Ft in an ε-neighborhood of x. In particular, for
ε small enough, we may change Ft outside that neighborhood to guarantee
that the set of solutions of u+ Ft(r − cu) = 1 is {0, x, 1}.
Considering the c.d.f. G(u) = 1 − Ft(r − cu), the proposition can be
rephrased as the probability of having no crossings of the empirical distribu-
tion of G and the (theoretical) uniform distribution near x:
An,ε = {∃ t ∈ [0, 1] : 1n#{G−1(U i) ≤ t} = t, |x− t| < ε}.
(To see this identity, note that 1n#{G−1(U i) ≤ t} = t implies t = k/n for
some 0 ≤ k ≤ n.) Following [27], this problem can be related to boundary-
crossing probabilities of Poisson processes which turn out to be computable.
In particular, after changing Ft as outlined above, the conditions of [27,
Theorem 1] are satisfied for G and noting that α = G′(x), this theorem
yields the result.
In view of Kn,t ⊆ K∗n,t, we have the following consequence (see also
Figure 6).
Corollary 6.8. Fix t ≥ 0 and let x ∈ [0, 1] satisfy x+ Ft(r − cx) = 1. If x
is strongly decreasing-transversal, then
lim
ε→0
lim
n→∞P (∃ k ∈ Kn,t : |x−
k
n | < ε) < 1.
Remark 6.9. One can ask if the non-existence result is related to the con-
vention made in Section 3 that players do not consider their own impact on
the state process. To address this question, we can drop the first equation
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Figure 6: Bounds for the probability of finding an n-player equilibrium
near x as in Corollary 6.8. The dashed and dashed-dotted lines are the upper
bounds derived from Proposition 6.7 and Proposition 6.11, respectively. The
solid line is the lower bound from Proposition 6.13.
in the equilibrium conditions (3.1) and keep only the second (which seems
uncontroversial); i.e., #{Y it + c kn < r} = n − k. This corresponds to the
definition of K∗n,t and Proposition 6.7 shows that non-existence holds even
under this condition alone.
Remark 6.10. Heuristics suggest that in the tangential case of a decreasing-
transversal x with α = 1, the limiting probability is 1; i.e., the equilibrium
is in fact a limit of n-player equilibria. The tangential case is less important
because it generically does not occur, in the same sense as discussed below
Definition 5.6. We do not provide a rigorous result.
In our last result, we determine the asymptotic expected number of equi-
libria close to x (for both increasing- and decreasing-transversal cases). Im-
portantly, it implies that this number is positive with positive probability.
When α > 1 is not close to 1, it also yields a fairly accurate upper bound
for the probability of not finding an n-player equilibrium close to x (cf. Ex-
ample 6.5) since the probability of finding more than one solution is small.
On the other hand, we see that as α→ 1, the expected number of solutions
tends to infinity, and in particular the probability of finding many solutions
becomes large9.
9In fact, one can show that limα→1 lim supn→∞ P (#{Kn,t ∩ |x− kn | < ε} = j) = 0 for
all finite j ≥ 0 when ε > 0 is small enough.
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Proposition 6.11. Fix t ≥ 0 and let x ∈ (0, 1) satisfy x + Ft(r − cx) = 1.
Let α := cft(r − cx) and assume that α 6= 1. Then
lim
ε→0
lim
n→∞E[#{k ∈ Kn,t : |x−
k
n | < ε}] =
e−α
|1− α| .
In particular,
lim sup
ε→0
lim sup
n→∞
P (∃ k ∈ Kn,t : |x− kn | < ε) ≤
e−α
|1− α| .
One consequence of Proposition 6.11 is that non-uniqueness is indeed the
typical case for the n-player game, as claimed in the Introduction: under the
stated smoothness assumption on Ft, we typically have at least one mean
field equilibrium corresponding to 0 6= α < 1 and then the proposition
and Lemma 6.2 imply that there is more than one n-player equilibrium, for
large n.
Proof of Proposition 6.11. We may assume that c = 1, and we drop the
index t everywhere. We denote
α(z) = f(r − z)
and recall that x ∈ (0, 1) and α = α(x) 6= 1. Fix ε > 0 and denote
x− = x− ε, x+ = x+ ε,
F− = F (r − x− ε), F+ = F (r − x+ ε),
α− = inf|z−x|<ε
α(z), α+ = sup
|z−x|<ε
α(z),
m(z) = inf
|z−x|≤ε
z(1− z), M(z) = sup
|z−x|≤ε
z(1− z).
We assume that ε is small enough such that x± ∈ (0, 1) and 1 /∈ [α−, α+].
Step 1: Bounds for P (k ∈ Kn). Fix n and let U i = F (Y i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n
so that (U i) are i.i.d. Unif[0, 1], and let U (1) ≥ · · · ≥ U (n) be the asso-
ciated reverse order statistics. Noting that U (k) = U(n−k+1) for the usual
(increasing) order statistics U(·), we have that U (k) ∼ Beta(n− k+ 1, k) and
U (k+1) = U (k)W
1
n−k
k where Wk ∼ Unif[0, 1] is independent; cf. [1, Section 4].
Moreover, we note that k ∈ Kn is equivalent to
U (k) ≥ F (r − k−1n ) =: Fk−1 and U (k+1) ≤ F (r − kn) =: Fk. (6.2)
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As a result, for any deterministic integer 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
P (k ∈ Kn) = P
(
U (k+1) ≤ Fk, U (k) ≥ Fk−1
)
=
∫ 1
Fk−1
P
(
U (k+1) ≤ Fk
∣∣U (k) = z) dP (U (k) = z)
=
∫ 1
Fk−1
P
(
W ≤ (Fk/z)n−k
∣∣U (k) = z) dP (U (k) = z)
=
n!
(n− k)!(k − 1)!
∫ 1
Fk−1
Fn−kk (1− z)k−1 dz
=
(
n
k
)
Fn−kk (1− Fk−1)k (6.3)
where dP (U (k) = z) indicates integration with respect to the law of U (k).
We may observe that this quantity is reminiscent of a binomial distribution
except that the success probability changes with k. Next, we use Taylor’s
theorem to find that
Fk−1 = F (r − kn + 1n) = F (r − kn) + αk/n = Fk + αk/n (6.4)
where αk = α(ηk) with ηk ∈ [k−1n , kn ] and in particular αk ∈ [α−, α+]. Now
suppose that |x− kn | < ε. Then k ≥ nx−, and using also Fk ≥ F−,
P (k ∈ Kn) =
(
n
k
)
Fn−kk (1− Fk − αk/n)k
=
(
n
k
)
Fn−kk (1− Fk)k
(
1− αk
(1− Fk)n
)k
≤
(
n
k
)
Fn−kk (1− Fk)k
(
1− α−
(1− F−)n
)nx−
.
The fact that
(1− y) ≤ e−y ≤ (1− y)(1 + o(y))
as y → 0 applied with y = w/n yields
(1− wn )n ≤ e−w ≤ (1− wn )n (1 +O(1/n))
as n → ∞, uniformly over w in a compact interval. This leads us to the
upper bound
P (k ∈ Kn) ≤
(
n
k
)
Fn−kk (1− Fk)ke
−α−x−
1−F− . (6.5)
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Similarly, we have the lower bound
P (k ∈ Kn) ≥
(
n
k
)
Fn−kk (1− Fk)k
(
1− α+
(1− F+)n
)nx+
≥
(
n
k
)
Fn−kk (1− Fk)ke
−α+x+
1−F+ (1 +O(1/n)).
Step 2: Decay away from x. Let us recall Robbin’s version [30] of the
Stirling approximation,
√
2pin(ne )
ne
1
12n+1 ≤ n! ≤
√
2pin(ne )
ne
1
12n , (6.6)
showing in particular that n! =
√
2pin (ne )
n (1 +O(1/n)). Since n− k and k
are comparable to n when |x− kn | < ε, we have(
n
k
)
= (1 +O(1/n))
√
2pin (ne )
n√
2pi(n− k) (n−ke )(n−k)
√
2pik (ke )
k
uniformly over all k such that |x− kn | < ε. This shows that
Zn,ε :=
∑
k: |x− kn |<ε
(
n
k
)
Fn−kk (1− Fk)k
= (1 +O(1/n))
∑
k: |x− kn |<ε
1√
2pin(1− kn) kn
Fn−kk (1− Fk)k
(1− kn)n−k( kn)k
≤ 1 +O(1/n)√
m(x)
∑
k: |x− kn |<ε
1√
2pin
Fn−kk (1− Fk)k
(1− kn)n−k( kn)k
. (6.7)
Our next goal is to estimate the summand above. We introduce the function
ϕ(z) = (1− z)n−kzk
so that
Fn−kk (1− Fk)k
(1− kn)n−k( kn)k
=
ϕ(1− Fk)
ϕ( kn)
(6.8)
is the term in question. We can use Taylor’s theorem similarly as above to
find
Fk = F (r − kn) = F (r − x+ x− kn) = F (r − x) + α˜k(x− kn)
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where α˜k ∈ [α−, α+]. As F (r− x) = 1− x, this equality can be rewritten as
Fk = 1− kn + (α˜k − 1)(x− kn).
Introducing also
ψ(z) = logϕ(z) = (n− k) log(1− z) + k log z,
we have
ψ′(z) = −n− k
1− z +
k
z
, ψ′′(z) = −n
[
1− kn
(1− z)2 +
k
n
z2
]
< 0
and then ψ′(k/n) = 0 shows that ψ and ϕ have a global maximum at k/n.
Taylor’s theorem at the second order yields
ψ(1−Fk)−ψ( kn) = ψ( kn−(α˜k−1)(x− kn))−ψ( kn) =
ψ′′(ξk)
2
(α˜k−1)2(x− kn)2
for a suitable number ξk between kn and
k
n − (α˜k − 1)(x − kn). Therefore,
we have |ξk − x| < Aε, with A = max{α+, 1}. Using the above formula for
ψ′′(z) and setting
Γε = inf|p−x|<ε
|z−x|<Aε
[
1− p
(1− z)2 +
p
z2
]
,
we arrive at
ψ(1− Fk)− ψ( kn) ≤ −
n
2
Γε(α˜k − 1)2(x− kn)2.
Setting also α∗ = α− if α > 1 and α∗ = α+ if α < 1, exponentiating leads
us to the desired estimate
ϕ(1− Fk)
ϕ( kn)
≤ exp
(
−n
2
Γε(α∗ − 1)2(x− kn)2
)
and plugging this into (6.7) we have that
Zn,ε ≤ 1 +O(1/n)√
m(x)
∑
k: |x− kn |<ε
1√
2pin
exp
(
−n
2
Γε(α∗ − 1)2(x− kn)2
)
.
Set
wk =
√
nΓε|α∗ − 1|( kn − x)
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and note that
∆w := wk − wk−1 = 1√
n
√
Γε|α∗ − 1|.
The above sum can then be written as
Zn,ε ≤ 1 +O(1/n)√
m(x)
∑
k: |wk|<
√
nΓε|α∗−1|ε
1√
2pin
e−w
2
k/2
=
1 +O(1/n)√
m(x)Γε
1
|α∗ − 1|
∑
k: |wk|<
√
nΓε|α∗−1|ε
1√
2pi
e−w
2
k/2∆w
which suggests comparison with a Gaussian integral
∫
R
1√
2pi
e−w2/2 dw = 1.
Indeed, after subtracting the two largest summands neighboring the origin,
the sum can be seen as a Riemann sum which is entirely below the integral.
These two summands are O(1/
√
n) so that∑
k: |wk|<
√
nΓε|α∗−1|ε
1√
2pi
e−w
2
k/2∆w ≤ 1 +O(1/√n)
and finally
Zn,ε ≤ 1√
m(x)Γε
1
|α∗ − 1| (1 +O(1/
√
n)).
Step 3: Conclusion. Recalling (6.5) we have
E[#{k ∈ Kn : |x− kn | < ε}] =
∑
k: |x− kn |<ε
P (k ∈ Kn)
≤ e−
α−x−
1−F− Zn,ε
≤ e−
α−x−
1−F−
1√
m(x)Γε
1
|α∗ − 1| (1 +O(1/
√
n))
and hence
lim sup
n→∞
E[#{k ∈ Kn : |x− kn | < ε}] ≤ e
−α−x−
1−F−
1√
m(x)Γε
1
|α∗ − 1| .
As ε→ 0 we have x− → x, α− → α, α∗ → α, F− → F (r − x) = 1− x and
m(x)→ x(1− x), Γε → 1
1− x +
1
x
=
1
x(1− x) .
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Thus,
lim sup
ε→0
lim sup
n→∞
E[#{k ∈ Kn : |x− kn | < ε}] ≤
e−α
|α− 1| .
The matching lower bound follows similarly after replacing α− by α+, F−
by F+, and so on.
Remark 6.12. The above proof offers insight into the speed of convergence
of n-player equilibria. Specifically, the estimates entail that if εn ↓ 0 is such
that εn
√
n→ β ∈ [0,∞], then
E[#{k ∈ Kn,t : |x− kn | < εn}]→
e−α
|1− α|µ
(
− |α− 1|√
x(1− x)β,
|α− 1|√
x(1− x)β
)
where µ is the standard Gaussian distribution. Thus, a ball of radius rn/
√
n
around x, where rn → ∞ arbitrarily slowly, will asymptotically contain all
n-player equilibria converging to x, and this is optimal in the sense that if
lim sup rn <∞ the ball will miss some solutions.
In our final result we complement the upper bound in Proposition 6.11
by a lower bound. The gap between the bounds vanishes for large α; see also
Figure 6.
Proposition 6.13. Fix t ≥ 0, let x ∈ (0, 1) satisfy x + Ft(r − cx) = 1 and
suppose that α := cft(r − cx) > 1. Then
lim inf
ε→0
lim inf
n→∞ P (∃ k ∈ Kn,t : |x−
k
n | < ε) ≥ L(α) > 0
where
L(α) =
e−α(
α− 1) (1 + 2√ 2|a0| {1− Φ(√2|a0|)})
with a0 := 1− α+ log(α) < 0 and Φ is the standard normal c.d.f.
Since the lower bound is strictly positive, we can interpret the result as
stating that x is necessarily part of a mixture which is itself a limit of n-
player equilibria. In summary, when x is strongly decreasing-transversal, we
cannot find n-player equilibria converging to x at time t, but at least we can
find n-player equilibria converging to a randomized mean field equilibrium
which charges x.
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Proof of Proposition 6.13. We use the notation from the proof of Proposi-
tion 6.11 and suppress t. Let K = Kn,t and X = Xn,ε = #{k ∈ Kn,t :
|x− kn | ≤ ε}. Set µ = E[X] and let
A = An,ε = {|X − cµ| ≥ cµ}
for a constant c > 0 to be chosen later. Clearly P (X = 0) ≤ P (A). Using
the Markov inequality
P (|X−cµ| ≥ cµ) ≤ E
(
(X − cµ)2)
c2µ2
=
E
(
X2
)
c2µ2
−2
c
+1 =
2
c
(
E
(
X2
)
2cµ2
− 1
)
+1
and choosing c = θE[X
2]
2µ2
for some θ > 1, we obtain that
P (X = 0) ≤ 1− 4µ
2(θ − 1)
θ2E[X2]
.
Optimizing over the right-hand side, we note that θ = 2 yields the best
bound, so we choose c = E[X
2]
µ2
and conclude that
P (X = 0) ≤ 1− µ
2
E[X2]
= 1− E[X]
2
E[X2]
. (6.9)
Since we have already determined the limit of E[X] in Proposition 6.11, our
goal is to find an upper bound for E[X2]. To that end, we first compute
P (k ∈ K, j ∈ K) = P (U (k+1) ≤ Fk, U (k) ≥ Fk−1, U (j+1) ≤ Fj , U (j) ≥ Fj−1)
for k < j; recall the notation of (6.2). In fact, this probability is zero for
j = k+1, so we focus on k+2 ≤ j. Conditionally on U (k+1) = h < U (k) = u,
the pair (U (j), U (j+1)) has the same distribution as (hV (j−(k+1)), hV (j−k))
where V (`) are the reverse order statistics of an i.i.d. sample V1, · · · , Vn−(k+1)
of size n− (k + 1) and distribution Unif[0, 1]. Thus, we have
P
(
U (j+1) ≤ Fj , U (j) ≥ Fj−1
∣∣U (k+1) = h, U (k) = u)
= P
(
V j−(k+1) ≤ Fj
h
, V (j−k) ≥ Fj−1
h
)
. (6.10)
Clearly P (V (j−k) ≥ Fj−1h ) = 0 if Fj−1 ≥ h, so we only need to consider the
case h ∈ [Fj−1, Fk]. Using the formula developed in (6.3), we obtain
P
(
U (j+1) ≤ Fj , U (j) ≥ Fj−1
∣∣U (k+1) = h, U (k) = u)
=
(
n− (k + 1)
j − (k + 1)
)(
Fj
h
)n−j (
1− Fj−1
h
)j−(k+1)
. (6.11)
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As above (6.2), the joint density of U (k) and U (k+1) can be computed using
the fact that U (k) ∼ Beta(n − k + 1, k) and U (k+1) = W
1
n−k
k U
(k) where
Wk ∼ Unif[0, 1] is independent of U (k):
dP
(
U (k) = u, U (k+1) = h
)
= k(n−k)
(
n
k
)
(1−u)k−1hn−(k+1) 10≤h≤u≤1 du dh.
Integrating with respect to this density and using the appropriate restric-
tions, we deduce that
P (k ∈ K, j ∈ K) = k(n− k)
(
n
k
)(
n− (k + 1)
j − (k + 1)
)
Fn−jj
×
∫ 1
Fk−1
(1− u)k−1 du
∫ Fk
Fj−1
(h− Fj−1)j−(k+1) dh
=
(
n
k
)
(1− Fk−1)k n− k
j − k
(
n− (k + 1)
j − (k + 1)
)
Fn−jj (Fk − Fj−1)j−k
=
(
n
k
)
(1− Fk−1)kFn−kk
(
n− k
j − k
)(
Fj
Fk
)n−j (
1− Fj−1
Fk
)j−k
≤
(
n
k
)
(1− Fk−1)kFn−kk
(
n− k
j − k
)(
Fj
Fk
)n−j (
1− Fj
Fk
)j−k
.
By a repeated application of (6.4) we have that FjFk = 1 −
αj(j−k)
nFk
for some
αj ∈ [α−, α+] and hence the last two terms above satisfy(
Fj
Fk
)n−j (
1− Fj
Fk
)j−k
≤
[
1− αj(j − k)
nFk
]n−j [αj(j − k)
nFk
]j−k
≤ exp
(
−α−(j − k)n− j
nFk
)
(α+)
j−k
(
j − k
nFk
)j−k
≤ exp
(
−α−(j − k)1− x+
F+
)
(α+)
j−k
(
j − k
nFk
)j−k
.
On the other hand, Stirling’s approximation as in (6.6) yields(
n− k
j − k
)(
j − k
nFk
)j−k
=
(n− k)!
(n− j)!(j − k)!
(
j − k
nFk
)j−k
≤
(
n− k
nFk
)j−k (j − k)j−k
(j − k)!
≤
(
1− x−
F−
)j−k
(j − k)j−k
[(
(j − k)
e
)j−k√
2pi(j − k) exp
(
1
12(j − k) + 1
)]−1
≤
(
1− x−
F−
)j−k ej−k√
2pi(j − k) .
35
As a result, we obtain the upper bound
P (k ∈ K, j ∈ K) ≤
(
n
k
)
(1− Fk−1)kFn−kk
1√
2pi(j − k) exp(a(j − k)) (6.12)
where
a = a(α, ε) := 1− α− 1− x+
F+
+ log(α+) + log
(
1− x−
F−
)
.
If the following sums run over indices i with |x − i/n| ≤ ε, we can express
the second moment of X as
E[X2] = E
[(∑
k
1k∈K
)(∑
j
1j∈K
)]
= E
[∑
k,j
1k∈K1j∈K
]
= E
[∑
k
1k∈K + 2
∑
k<j
1k∈K1j∈K
]
=
∑
k
P (k ∈ K) + 2
∑
k<j
P (k ∈ K, j ∈ K).
Thus, (6.12) leads to
E[X2] =
∑
k: |x−k/n|≤ε
P (k ∈ K) + 2
∑
k,j: j≥k+2,
|x−k/n|≤ε,
|x−j/n|≤ε
P (k ∈ K, j ∈ K)
≤ E[X] + 2√
2pi
E[X]
n(x+−x−)∑
`=2
1√
`
ea`.
Note that a0 := limε↓0 a(α, ε) = 1−α+log(α) is strictly negative since α > 1.
Thus, a = a(α, ε) < 0 for ε small enough, so that 1√
`
ea` is summable. More
precisely,
1√
2pi
∞∑
`=2
1√
`
ea` ≤ 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
1
1√
`
ea` d` =
√
2
|a|
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
√
2|a|
e
−z2
2 dz.
Recalling also that limε→0 limn→∞E[X] = e
−α
|α−1| =: H(α) by Proposition 6.11,
we deduce that
lim sup
ε→0
lim sup
n→∞
E[X2] ≤ H(α)
(
1 + 2
√
2
|a0|
(
1− Φ
(√
2|a0|
)))
and combining this with (6.9) yields the claim.
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